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THE TRUSTEE IN BANiillUPTCY AS A
SECURED CREDITOR UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Frank R. Kennedy*

S

A and B both have security interests in property of their
common debtor D; A's rights are superior to B's; and Dis bank-

UPPOSE

rupt:
(I) If neither A's security intereilt nor that of B can be
avoided on a direct attack by the trustee under the Bankruptcy
Act, should A's priority over B outside of bankruptcy enable the
trustee to defeat B's security interest in bankruptcy?
(2) If A's security interest can be avoided by the trustee but
B's cannot, can the trustee by asserting A's rights against B avoid
B's rights without regard to the amount of A's secured debt or
the value of the collateral?
A negative answer to both questions has always seemed to me to
be the only one compatible with the underlying assumptions of the
Bankruptcy Act and one that accords a fair respect to the rights of
secured creditors. From time to time, however, there have appeared
in print suggestions that an affirmative answer can be given.1 In par• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, Southwest Missouri State College; LL.B. 1939, Washington University; J.S.D. 1953, Yale University.-Ed.
I wish to acknowledge the assistance given me by Mr. A. Rodriguez Bautista, LL.B.,
University of the Philippines; LL.M., University of Michigan; and now a third-year
student in the University of Michigan School of Law, in the preparation of this article.
A special acknowledgment to the late Professor James A. MacLachlan is also appropriate here. As is pointed out in the text accompanying note 24 infra, this article
is essentially an elaboration of a position he had taken and supported in his treatise
on Bankruptcy in 1956. I had intended to show him my manuscript before its publication in this symposium so that it might have the benefit of his critical examination.
A tragic accident on April 17, 1967, took his life and prevented my submission of the
paper for his scrutiny and suggestions. I am nevertheless deeply indebted to him for
the contributions he unknowingly made to this study.
1. See, e.g., COUNTRYMAN, CASES ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 453, 489 (1964); Coleman,
The Uniform Commercial Code Applied in Bankruptcy: A Few Important Problems,
19 ALA. L. REv. 59, 62 (1966); Comment, 39 TEX. L. REv. 616, 620-21 (1961).
Professor Countryman, in a note following Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364
U.S. 603 (1961), states:
[W]here the only consequence of delay in filing is to invalidate a chattel mortgage
as to creditors who acquire a lien before filing, and the mortgage is filed before
bankruptcy, § 70c will not avail the trustee-and neither will § 70e unless an actual
creditor with a provable claim acquired a lien before filing. In re Consorto Construction Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954).
Actually a United States tax lien and a Pennsylvania lien for unpaid corporation taxes
were perfected during the interim between execution and recording of the chattel mortgage under attack in Consorto. 212 F.2d at 677. Professor Countryman cites cases holding tax claims to be provable at pp. 506 and 672-73 of his casebook. The possibility
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ticular it has been argued that a trustee may avoid utterly any perfected security interest that is subordinated by the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) to the lien of any creditor with a provable
claim.2
This argument rests on three propositions that are in themselves
sound enough:
(I) The trustee is entitled to assert the right of any actual
creditor with a provable claim to avoid a security interest (or any
other transfer) under section 70.e of the act.
(2) The fact that a creditor is secured does not make his
claim nonprovable.
(3) Under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay,3 the right of the
trustee to avoid a transfer under section 70e is not limited by
the amount of the claim of the creditor whose right of avoidance
is being enforced.
The thesis of this article is that a trustee cannot exploit the advantage of the lien or security of any creditor unless he can avoid it
and displace a creditor. Moreover, when he can and does avoid a lien
and displace a creditor, he can enforce the rights of that creditor as
against any lien or interest otherwise indefeasible in bankruptcy
only to the extent of the lien or security of the creditor he displaces.

I.

THE DoCTRINE OF

Moore v. Bay

Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act reads in pertinent part as follows:
A transfer made or suffered ... by a debtor adjudged a bankthat the trustee could have utilized the, priority of the tax lienors to defeat the chattel
mortgage was nevertheless not adverted to in Consorto.
Although the commentator in the Texas Law Review could find no cases to support
his suggestion, he thought it "reasonably clear" that the trustee could avoid a federal
tax lien otherwise indefeasible under § 70e if a creditor with a provable claim was also
a judgment creditor, mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser protected by § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This reasoning would afford the trustee an effective
remedy whenever he can find a creditor with a provable claim who is one of the many
varieties of persons protected by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 80 Stat. 1125 (1966),
26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967). The commentator does not say whether the judgment
creditor, mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser would be displaced when the trustee asserts
his rights in bankruptcy or whether the trustee can effectively assert the rights of the
protected person only when there is a surplus.
2. Professor Riesenfeld has recently put the matter as follows:
A contract creditor who succeeds in squeezing in an attachment lien under section
9-301(l)(b) or (2) will supply the trustee with Moore v. Bay powers. Although the
creditor is secured and his claim is not allowable, it is a provable claim as required
by section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Riesenfeld, Book Review, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1854, 1857 (1966); accord, 4 CoLLIER, BANK•
RUPTCY ,r 70.62, at 1494.23 n.86 &: 1494.24 (14th ed. rev. 1964) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; 2 HAWKLAND, A TRANsAcnONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COJ\tMERCIAL CODE 683,
695 (1964).
3. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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rupt under this Act which, under any Federal or State law applicable
thereto, is . . . voidable for any . . . reason by any creditor of the
debtor, having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and
void as against the trustee of such debtor.

Afoore v. Bay4 involved an avoidance by a trustee of a belatedly
recorded chattel mortgage which was voidable under California law
only by creditors who extended credit before the recordation. The
lower courts had given the mortgage priority over creditors who extended credit after recordation. In a cryptic opinion reversing the
decree below, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
The trustee in bankruptcy gets the title to all property which has
been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors or which prior
to the petition he could by any means have transferred, or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him. Act of July I, 1898, c. 541, sec. 70. By section 67a claims which
for want of record or for other reasons would not have been valid
liens as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not
be liens against his estate. The rights of the trustee by subrogation
are to be enforced for the benefit of the estate.5
The above quotation was all the Court said about the trustee's
right to avoid the chattel mortgage in the case. The first sentence is
an oversimplified summary of section 70a of the act. The last sentence
quoted is a restatement of the substance of former section 67b. A
single sentence was added at the end of the two-paragraph opinion to
deal with the distribution of "what thus is recovered for the benefit
of the estate." No question has ever been raised as to the correctness
of the disposition of this latter issue. However, critics of the decision
who believe that the Court failed to realize that this was not the only
issue are afforded considerable support by the opinion itself. 6
In any event, the case now stands for the proposition that if the
trustee can find one qualified creditor in a position to avoid a transfer
of the bankrupt's property, the trustee's right is not limited by the
amount of that creditor's claim.7 Insofar as section 70e endows the
trustee with the standing of a subrogee, the foregoing statement of
the doctrine of Moore v. Bay contravenes a fundamental attribute of
subrogation-that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights
than those of the person to whose position he is subrogated.8 That
4. Ibid.
5. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).
6. See l\fAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 331 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MACLACHLAN];
Scott, The Meaning of the Provisions for Recordation of a Transfer as Applicable to
Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act and a Critique of the Decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Case of Moore v. Bay, 18 VA. L. REv. 249,266 (1932).
7. 4 CoUJER ,r 70.95 (1959).
8. Scott, supra note 6, at 267.
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indeed is one of the unanswerable criticisms that can be made of the
doctrine, but Moore v. Bay has survived well laid attacks on its illogicality as well as its inequity,9 and this paper is not intended to
renew them. The argument here is a more modest one, namely, that
the anomalous doctrine should not be extended. It is extremely awkward to argue that an illogical rule ought to be circumscribed by
considerations of a logical character, but that is the view that this
article will seek to sustain.
In attempting to understand the operation of section 70e, students
are often confused by statements which indicate that, although a
general creditor may attack a belatedly perfected security interest,
he must first obtain a lien through judicial proceedings. Such statements are frequently encountered in discussions of the pre-Code law
of California, Michigan, New York, and other states where creditors
extending credit before perfection of a security interest coµld nevertheless levy on the property after perfection.10 It was in such states
9. The doctrine has not lacked defenders. See, e.g., 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 866-67 (rev. ed. 1940); Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-Should Its Rule
Be Abolished?, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955); Comment, 17 .ARK. L. R.Ev. 46, 56 (1962); 45 YALE
L.J. 504, 506 (1936). The doctrine relieves the trustee of the burden of justifying
the full measure of relief sought under § 70e by proving the identity of all the creditors
who could have avoided a transfer but for bankruptcy and proving the amounts of their
claims. Moreover, the doctrine has implemented the bankruptcy policy of hostility to
secret liens.
The commentator in the Arkansas Law Review, cited supra, adds that if the creditor
to whose position the trustee is subrogated under § 70e gets only a pro rata share of
the recovery, "this creditor would justifiably feel shortchanged if a pro tanto recovery
in his favor was then distributed among all claimants, leaving him with only a fraction
of what he would have recovered had it not been for the intervention of bankruptcy."
17 ARK. L. REv. at 56. The fact of the matter is that, irrespective of the amount of the
trustee's recovery under § 70e, any general creditor is not likely to receive a substantial
distribution in bankruptcy. All claims entitled to priority under § 64 must be paid in
full before anything is available for creditors without priority, and all the general
creditors are then required to share pro rata in the balance, if any. In any event the
disappointed expectations of the creditor who furnished the trustee his right of avoidance are not a rational justification for enlarging the trustee's right of recovery at the
expense of the transferee for the benefit of persons not falling within the ambit of protection of the nonbankruptcy law invoked by the trustee under § 70e.
10. See, e.g., Noyes v• .Bank of Italy, 206 Cal. 266, 269-70, 274 Pac. 68, 70 (1929);
Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 37, 261 N.W. 128, 130 (1935); .Button
v. Rathbone, Sard &: Co., 126 N.Y. 187, 191, 27 N.E. 266, 267 (1891).
Such statements involved no contradiction or confusion in purpose. As the Supreme
Court of Michigan explained in Dempsey v. Pforzheimer, 86 Mich. 652, 656, 49 N.W.
465, 466-67 (1891):
The gist of the reason is that the creditor has no business with the debtor's
property until he has obtained possession of it by some legal process that gives him
a lien upon it.•.• [S]uch creditors [of the mortgagor] have no right to touch the
debtor's property without his consent, without legal process • . • •
,
Professor Marsh has suggested that the California court in Noyes seemed to have
"adopted a wholly untenable construction of section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, i.e.,
that the trustee could claim to be a creditor who acquired a lien as of some date prior
to bankruptcy." Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated,
43 CALIF. L. REv. 65, 69 n.20 (1955). On the contrary, the court explicitly recognized
"that the trustee acquired a lien status as of the time when the petition in bankruptcy

May 1967]

Article Nine: Bankruptcy

1423

that Moore v. Bay had its principal utility for the trustee. As Professor
Gilmore explains:
[W]e assumed Justice Holmes would have said in Moore v. Bay if
he had dotted his i's and crossed his t's: § 70(c) merely supplements
§ 70(e) by conferring lien status on the trustee in his representation
of existing or actual creditors if applicable state law provides that
only lien creditors can avoid the challenged transaction.11

This is not to say, however, that the trustee must show that he represents an existing or actual creditor in order to avoid an unperfected
security interest under the Code. When the applicable state law invalidates or subordinates a security interest at the instance of a
creditor who obtains a lien by judicial proceedings without regard to
the date or other circumstances attending the extension of credit,
the trustee prevails under section 70c without more. 12
As an original matter, there is much to be said for the rule that
permitted any creditor who extended credit during a period of delay
in the perfection of a security interest in the debtor's property to prevail over that interest notwithstanding the fact that perfection preceded the creditor's levy. 13 It ran a good idea into the ground, however, to invalidate a security interest in toto for the benefit of all the
unsecured creditors because of a delay which was presumptively prejwas filed." Noyes v. Bank of Italy, supra at 269-70, 274 Pac. at 70. The trustee represented actual creditors whose claims arose before the belated perfection of the mortgage.
II. 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1295 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE]. Professor Riesenfeld submitted a proposal to the National Bankruptcy Conference in 1956 which would have in substance codified the view of the
trustee's status under § 70c and e presented in the text. 1956 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL MEETING 68. The Conference approved
the proposal in principle. Id. at 14. The proposal was not presented to Congress for
enactment, presumably because legislation was not thought to be necessary to establish
the rule.
12. See 4 COLLIER 1f 70.51, at 1429 (1959). The Pre-Code law of Washington construed
in Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962), allowed only subsequent
creditors to take advantage of a delay in the perfection of a conditional sale, and the
court rejected an attack on a belatedly filed conditional sale of an automobile to the
bankrupt because the trustee could find no actual creditor who had extended credit to
the bankrupt after the sale. This kind of problem is avoided by Article Nine of the
Code in that a lien creditor is protected against an unperfected security interest without regard to the date of extension of the credit by the lien creditor. See U.C.C. §§
9-30I(l)(b), 9-313(4)(b) 8: 9-314(3)(b).
13. Any perfection requirement that assures some form of notice to creditors would
seem best to serve its purpose if compliance occurs before the creditor changes his position by extending credit. See Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 806, 899 (1961). This was the premise
of the pre-Code Michigan law. See, e.g., Ransom 8: Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich.
31, 261 N.W. 128 (1935), 14 MICH. ST. B.J. 422 (1935). The case for protecting a creditor
who acquired his claim before the execution of the security interest against delay in its
perfection was certainly less cogent. The classic explanation was that such a creditor
might be lulled into forbearing to enforce collection by the appearance of unencumbered ownership during the delay in perfection. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E.
1073 (1893).
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udicial to no more than one or a very few creditors. The risks and
attendant inconveniences generated by Moore v. Bay could hardly
have been overlooked during the formulation of the policy and language of section 9-301 of the Code, which lists the persons who take
priority over unperfected security interests.14 In any event, the Code's
adoption of the lien creditor test in section 9-301 was a deliberate
rejection of the rule of state law that underlay the ruling of that
notorious case.
I!.

SUBROGATION OF THE TRUSTEE TO THE RIGHTS OF A
CREDITOR HOLDING A VALID LIEN

As acknowledged at the ~utset of the article, the claim of a creditor is provable notwithstanding the fact that it is secured.15 If one
argues from this premise, however, that the trustee may avoid any
interest which is inferior to that of any secured creditor with a provable claim, the suggestion is startling in its implications. The repercussions from Benedict v. Ratner, 16 Moore v. Bay,11 Corn Exchange
Bank v. Klauder, 18 and Constance v. Harvey 19 would be minor indeed compared to the consequences of according to the trustee the
position of the most preferred secured creditor of the bankrupt's
estate. In fact, the result would be nothing less than a general
avoidance of all junior liens and interests in bankruptcy.20 Since it
14. Dean Hawkland has suggested that "the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial
Code set out to drastically curtail the doctrine of Moore v. .Bay." Hawkland, The Impact of the Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67 COM. L.J. 359, 361
(1962). Professor Gilmore has intimated, however, that the prevailing considerations in
the drafting of § 9-301(1)(b) were that (I) protection of lien creditors against unperfected security interests afforded a sufficiently effective sanction to discourage dilatoriness in complying with perfection requirements; and that (2) all legislation dealing with
this subject matter drafted in this century protected only lien creditors (and purchasers). 1 GILMORE 489.
The pernicious potentialities of the doctrine derived from Moore v. Bay are discussed
in MACLACHLAN 330-35.
15. See 4 CoLLIER ,r 70.90, at 1729-30 (1959). The reference to Collier cited in note 2
supra is to a portion of the treatise written by Professor Lawrence King and incorporated into Collier in 1964. The text of this article discusses only the portion of Collier,
cited supra in this note, which was contributed in 1959.
16. 268 U.S. 353 (1925); see, e.g., Cohen &: Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable,
29 GEO. L.J. 555 (1941).
17. 284 U.S. 4 (1931); see MACLACHLAN 330-33; Scott, supra note 6, at 265-69.
18. 318 U.S. 434 (1943); see, e.g., Keeffe, Kelly &: Lewis, Sick Sixty, A Proposed Revision of Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1947); Kupfer &: Livingston, Com Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REv. 910 (1946).
19. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 391 (1956). See Marsh, supra
note 10; Weintraub, Levin,&: Beldock, The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 261 (1956).
20. It should be acknowledged here that no one has been so bold as to argue cate•
gorically that the trustee should be able to assert the priority of the secured creditor
having the topmost lien of any and every kind against the bankrupt's property. My
point, hereinafter elaborated, is that if the trustee is allowed to assert the right of a
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is practically impossible for a secured party to prevent the attachment
of a prior lien of some kind, the hazards posed by bankruptcy for
secured creditors would be more fearsome than has ever been acknowledged.
In 1951 the late Professor James MacLachlan raised the question
here considered before the National Bankruptcy Conference.21 At its
annual meetings in 1953 and 1954, the Conference approved his
proposal for an amendment of section 70e limiting the trustee's
rights thereunder to those of an unsecured creditor.22 The proposed
amendment thereafter dropped out of drafts of section 70e considered by the Conference-no doubt for the reason that admittedly
no case had presented the question and other problems of more
urgency pre-empted the attention devoted to that subdivision.23 Professor MacLachlan's treatise, which appeared in 1956, included a
trenchant discussion of the question,24 and this article is an elaboration of the position there taken-that the trustee's rights under
section 70e are limited to those of an unsecured creditor. Judicial
authority, while not extensive, is in accord. 25
lien creditor or any other variety of secured creditor to prevail over the rights of any
other interest in property of a bankrupt estate without regard to the assumptions implicit in the preservation provisions and the law of subrogation generally, there is no
basis in the Bankruptcy Act for distinguishing between the kinds of liens the trustee
can use to his advantage. See text following note 53 infra.
21. 1951 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL
MEETING 39.
22. 1954 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL
MEETING 8; 1953 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL MEETING 10.
23. Notably the matter of taming Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 391 (1956) which threatened to make § 70e superfluous.
24. MACLACHLAN 335-36. Commentators in accord include Coogan & Vagts, The
Secured Creditor and the Bankruptcy Act: An Introduction in I CooGAN, HOGAN &
VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. 971, 990-91 (1963); 2 GILMORE 1289;
Wiseman & King, Perfection, Filing and Forms Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commerdal Code, 9 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 580, 596 (1963).
25. Michigan Fire Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Md. 1960)
(trustee denied subrogation under § 70e to priority of federal tax lien); In re F. A.
Whitney Carriage Co., 173 F. Supp. 709 (D. Mass. 1953) (trustee denied right to assert
statutory lien of commonwealth as against mortgagee who allegedly failed to comply
with bulk transfer statute); Silverman v. Wedge, 339 Mass. 244, 158 N.E.2d 668 (1959)
(same); Sellers v. Hayes, 163 Ind. 422, 72 N.E. 119 (1904) (trustee denied benefit of statutory lien conferred on wholesalers against stock of merchandise of retailer transferred
in bulk). The state statutes considered in the Whitney, Silverman, and Sellers cases cited
supra declared the transfers to which they applied "fraudulent and void" as against the
protected classes of creditors.
Attempts by the trustee to ride on the priority of a federal tax lien over security
interests failed in two recent cases when the trustee failed to establish the existence of
a tax lien with priority. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 337 F .2d 978 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965); Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co., 224 Md. 408,
168 A.2d 358, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 830 (1961), 3 B.C. IND. & COM. L. R.Ev. 72 (1961).
Neither court indicated that, had the trustee carried the burden of identifying a tax
lien with priority, it would have sustained the claimed right of subrogation.
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An authority citable for the proposition that the trustee under
section 70e may assert the rights of a secured creditor is Collier on
Bankruptcy,26 and since I share responsibility for the portion of
Collier that discusses this matter, an explanation is in order. Three
cases are cited therein for support, including notably Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.27 As a footnote accompanying the
discussion in Collier explains, a secured creditor has a "provable
claim to its full amount, even though it is allowable only as to the
excess, if any, of the claim over the value of the security.''28 Thus,
if a transfer by the bankrupt is voidable as against such a creditor,
the literal language of § 70e would enable the trustee to nullify the
voidable transfer in its entirety. The secured creditor would ultimately, of course, be entitled to so much of the proceeds as were
necessary to satisfy his lien; any excess would be for the estate. The
Central Chandelier Co. case ... proceeds on that theory.29
The opinion in Central Chandelier is, however, almost as cryptic
as that in Moore v. Bay.30 A conditional seller of lighting fixtures to
a building corporation had sued to enforce its security interest for
the unpaid purchase price. During the pendency of this litigation
the building corporation went into bankruptcy, and the trustee,
having been substituted as defendant, sought to rely on the in26. 4 COLLIER ,f 70.90, at 1729·30 (1959).
27. 259 N.Y. 343, 182 N.E. 10 (1932). The other cases cited are Brookhaven Bank &:
Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F.2d 17, 23 n.5 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Cofax Corp., 96 F. Supp.
420 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The following cases are then cited after the signal But cf.: Otte v.
Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893, 900, afj'd, 256 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1958), discussed in notes 38 &:
39 infra; Sellers v. Hayes, 163 Ind. 422, 72 N.E. 119 (1904), discussed in note 25 supra.
In the footnote to the opinion in Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, cited supra,
the court of appeals indicated that the trustee in bankruptcy could have invalidated a
Belatedly filed chattel mortgage under § 70e by relying on the rights of an intervening
judgment lienor. The judgment lien had been obtained over four months before bankruptcy, and the court sustained the judgment creditor's claim to priority over the chat•
tel mortgagee under Mississippi law. The observation regarding the trustee's rights was
a dictum, inasmuch as the trustee had abandoned the property to the competing lienors
upon learning that the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the lien of either creditor.
The court did not intimate whether it thought the trustee had erred in waiving further
claim to the property or whether he might have been able to utilize the judgment creditor's priority had there been a surplus over the amount of the judgment lien.
In re Cofax, cited supra, is tenuous authority for allowing the trustee to assert the
priority of a tax lienor against the competing lien of a judgment creditor under § 70e.
The judgment creditor had served a third-party subpoena on a debtor of the bankrupt
over four months before bankruptcy, but the court identified three alternate grounds
for rejecting the judgment creditor's claim of a lien: (I) the period of limitations applicable to the lien had run out; (2) the judgment creditor had waived his lien by filing
an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding; and (3) the state and city of New
York and the federal government had priority over the judgment creditor's claim of
lien, and, as claimants with provable claims, they afforded the trustee a position from
which to assert priority. The court did not consider the status of the tax liens independently of their relation to the judgment creditor's claim.
28. 4 COLLIER 1[ 70.90, at 1730 n.28 (1959).
29. Ibid.
30. And no lower court opinion in Central Chandelier was reported.
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validity of the conditional sale as against a mortgagee of the real
estate. The mortgagee was entitled to prevail under section 7 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act,31 then in force, by virtue of an
advance which had been made after the affixation of the fixtures but
without actual or constructive notice of the retention of title. The
lower courts had ruled for the defendant trustee, and on appeal the
vendor challenged the standing of the trustee to rely on the superior
rights of the mortgagee as a defense to the action. The court of appeals rejected the vendor's contention on this point with the unenlightening observation that
the trustee represents . . . all creditors, and is thus interested in preserving the assets of the estate. Incidentally, the trustee is interested
in preserving the validity of the mortgage security for the title company and thus reducing a possible deficiency judgment against the
bankrupt.32
The statement in Collier that the trustee may assert a secured
creditor's right to avoid a transfer in its entirety, although the
trustee could reach only the surplus over the amount required to
satisfy the lien,33 is correct in the light of the doctrine of Moore v.
Bay which underlies it. Thus, suppose that over four months before
bankruptcy a creditor of the bankrupt obtained a lien by an attachment or creditor's bill in a proceeding instituted to avoid a fraudulent transfer of the property subjected to the lien. Although the
lien itself would not be avoidable by the trustee, he should be permitted to intervene in the litigation as a co-plaintiff. In the event of
successful prosecution of the action to avoid the transfer, the trustee
31. The second sentence of which read in pertinent part as follows:
If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently
as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property shall be void after the goods are so affixed as
against subsequent purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of the
conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale con1ract • • • shall be filed
before such purchase in the office where a deed of the realty would be recorded
• • • to affect such realty.
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES

Acr § 7.

32. 259 N.Y. at 347, 182 N.E. at 12. One can only speculate as to why the plaintiff
did not join the mortgagee as a codefendant with the mortgagor in its action, but in
any event it is ordinarily inappropriate for the trustee to seek to vindicate the priority
of one secured creditor over that of another. Insofar as the trustee succeeded in reducing
the possible deficiency judgment of the mortgagee by preserving the validity of the
mortgage, he presumably augmented the deficiency claim of another secured creditor.
A more substantial justification for according standing to the trustee to invoke the
priority of the mortgage would have been to enable him to avoid the risk of a judgment
binding him to honor the conditional seller's priority in the proceeds of the sale of the
encumbered property while the estate remained subject to a probable liability to the
mortgagee as the holder of a first lien against the same property. Such a rationale, of
course, falls considerably short of recognizing that the trustee was subrogated to the
priority of the mortgagee or to any right of avoidance of the conditional sale.
33. Quoted in text accompanying note 29 supra.
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would be able to reach any excess value in the property transferred
-that is, if the secured creditor had a provable claim.34 It would be
unnecessary for the trustee to show that the transfer was fraudulent
and voidable as to any other creditor, for, in such a case, the trustee
would not be relying on the priority of the creditor's lien, but rather
on the voidability of the transfer by the creditor. The observation
in Collier3 5 that Central Chandelier Co. proceeds on this theory is
conjectural, since the court does not disclose any theory or indeed
whether it was concerned with any surplus above the amount required to pay the mortgagee. In any event, the situation presented
in that case did not afford the trustee any justification for invocation of the theory, since the conditional seller's interest was voidable
by the mortgagee not as a creditor but as a subsequent purchaser of
the realty for value and without notice of the conditional seller's
title.36 To allow the trustee to take the particularly privileged
position of such a purchaser because the purchaser also happened
to be a creditor with a provable claim would involve a perversion
of the purposes of both the state law and the Bankruptcy Act.37

III.

THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHT TO PRIORITY UNDER SECTION 70E

On a purely semantic level, the mischief that may be generated
by subrogating the trustee to secured creditors' rights under section
70e may be confined by insisting that the subdivision does not enable
the trustee to assert the priority of any creditor with a provable claim
over any transferee; rather, the statute enables the trustee only to
invoke any rule of law which makes a transfer "fraudulent or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor.'' 38 This suggestion admittedly relies heavily on the lexicon of the legislator.
34. Carothers v. Weaver, 220 Ala. 584, 586, 127 So. 151, 152 (1930) (creditor holding
indefeasible lien by creditor's bill not displaced but trustee allowed to join in suit on
behalf of unsecured creditors to reach any surplus above lien).
35. 4 COLLIER ,1170.90, at 1730 n.28 (1959).
36. "The implication of the second sentence of § 7 is that one not a subsequent purchaser of the realty for value and without notice-e.g., a trustee in bankruptcy--cannot
object to a failure of the conditional vendor to comply with the filing requirements
prescribed by the sentence." 4 COLLIER 11 70.20, at ll60 n.23 (1959).
37. Candor requires an acknowledgment that the critique of Central Chandelier set
out in the text is not entirely in accord with the discussion of the same case in the passages of Collier which are cited in notes 26-29 supra. That discussion was part of a
revision of the original version of 11 70.90 included in the 14th edition of that work
which I prepared in 1959. I can only say that I state the case as it appears to me now,
38. This ground was explicitly taken in rejecting a trustee's attack under § 70e in
Otte v. Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 1956), affd, 256 F.2d ll3 (6th Cir.
1958), and in Michigan Fire &: Marine Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183 F. Supp. 533,
537 (D. Md. 1960). It is also ventured as a basis for denying the trustee a right to prevail over an unperfected security interest in fixtures in Coogan, Security Interests in
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1339 (1962), reprinted in 1 CooGAN, HoGAN &: VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1804. Mr. Coogan reports
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The Code generally eschews saying that any security interest is
voidable by another. Thus, section 9-301 is entitled "Persons Who
Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests." Subsection (1)
then lists persons to whose rights an unperfected security interest is
subordinate and includes therein a "lien creditor without knowledge." The Internal Revenue Code, on the other hand, declares
that the federal tax lien shall not be valid as against a security interest unless notice is filed. 39 It would be an indefensible interpretation of section 70e to permit the trustee to invoke the position of
the holder of a security interest against a subsequently filed tax lien
because the latter is invalidated, but deny the trustee the position
of a lien creditor who levies before a security interest is perfected
because the latter is merely subordinated. The point, however, is
that the trustee should be subrogated to neither the priority of a
lien creditor under section 9-301 nor to the right of any of the beneficiaries of the tax notice-filing statute unless the trustee can displace
the lien or other interest of the protected party.
If a creditor should exploit the easy opportunity afforded by the
Code to obtain and perfect a security interest against all of the
debtor's personal property and fixtures, the trustee could step into
the advantageous position occupied by such a creditor as against
all inferior interests and liens upon the collateral. Moreover, even
that farsighted and hard-fisted creditor could be frustrated by the
trustee if the trustee could find a subsequent purchase-money security interest holder who took the precautions prescribed by section
9-312(3) or (4). 40 And the purchase-money secured creditor could be
that Collier cites Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co. as contra in the passages
discussed in the text accompanying notes 26-29 supra, and then notes that the court did
not there mention § 70e. As pointed out in the text accompanying note 31 supra, the
trustee was relying on § 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which did not merely
confer a priority but purported to make the conditional seller's security interest void as
against the mortgagee. Although § 70e was not cited by the court, it is the only provision which would have authorized him to represent the creditors in resisting the suit
by the conditional seller.
39. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a).
40. I have encountered the suggestion that although a lien creditor is merely accorded priority over an unperfected security interest by § 9-30l(b) of the Code, the provision is actually an avoidance section and therefore is a state law of the kind contemplated
by § 70e of the act. This argument is supposed to draw strength from the following
propositions: (1) the Code's requirement that most kinds of personal property security
be perfected by notice-filing or the taking of possession in order to prevail as against
lien creditors is a rule intended to protect creditors against the misleading appearance
of unencumbered ownership in their debtor; (2) the law of ostensible ownership, deriving as it does from Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601), is part
of the law of fraudulent conveyances; and (3) any law protecting creditors against fraudulent conveyances or secret liens is a law which Congress intended to be available to
the trustee under § 70e.
Whenever applicable state law requires any instrument affecting real estate to be
recorded in order to be valid as against a judgment lienor, the trustee would, under
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cut out too if the trustee could find a tax lien or any other variety of
statutory lien having priority under applicable law, including section
9-310 of the Code.
An unsecured creditor sometimes has priority over a security
interest under nonbankruptcy law. Curiously it has seldom been
suggested that the trustee in bankruptcy should be able to exploit
the priority of such a creditor in order to defeat a security interest.
The Bankruptcy Act has its own system of priorities for unsecured
creditors. While limited recognition is given to priorities conferred
by nonbankruptcy law in section 64a(5),41 state-created priorities
are generally ineffective in bankruptcy. Thus there would be no significant problem of displacement if the trustee were allowed to be
subrogated to the priority of an unsecured creditor over a security
interest. The suggestion nevertheless runs counter to the uniform
construction of the act. 42
this kind of argument, be entitled to invoke § 70e if a judgment lien attached to the
property after the debtor-owner had executed an instrument of transfer but before it
could be recorded. And presumably the trustee would be able to assert the right of the
United States as a tax lienor against any prior security interest that is not protected
against a judgment lien creditor at the time the tax lien is filed, since the Internal
Revenue Code manifestly undertakes to afford the Government all the protection ap•
plicable state law gives to judgment lien creditors against secret liens. INT. R.Ev. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 6323(a) &: (h)(l).
If I understand the argument now being considered regarding the legitimate use of
§ 70e by the trustee as a subrogee of a lien creditor, the trustee would not be able to
step into the shoes of a creditor who acquired his lien before any competing interest
attached. In that situation, the lien creditor would prevail because of his priority and
not because of any right of avoidance, and the trustee would have no basis for subrogation under § 70e. Although it would not make any difference for any other purpose, it
would thus be crucial in the application of this subdivision whether the security interest under attack attached before or after the property became subject to the conflicting lien relied on by the trustee.
The cases cited in note 38 supra which deny trustees' efforts to assert the priority
of tax creditors may be thought to be reconcilable with the argument here considered.
The unsuccessful trustee in Michigan Fire &: Marine Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183
F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1960), was, however, relying on the "ineffectiveness" of an equi•
table lien asserted by the bankrupt's financier as against a tax lien which arose after the
equitable lien was supposed to have attached.
Suppose that after A obtains a security interest in the personalty of D but before
the security interest is perfected, B, a creditor of D, with a provable claim, obtains and
perfects a security interest in the same collateral. Has B a right of avoidance to which
the trustee is subrogated under § 70e, or merely a right of priority which does not pass
to the trustee under this section? The argument of this article is that the trustee can
avail himself of B's priority if but only if he can avoid B's security interest, for example, as a preference under § 60 or as a fraudulent transfer under § 70e. In such an event
the trustee would be limited as subrogee by the amount of B's claim.
41. Section 64a(5) recognizes a limited priority for a landlord when granted by state
law and priority for nontax claims of the United States when the conditions of REv.
STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964) are met. The priority so recognized is the
lowest of the five levels provided by § 64, and the fact that nonbankruptcy law may
assign first rank to an unsecured claim of the landlord or the Government is ineffective
to lift it above the station prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
42. Shortly after the decision of the Third Circuit in In re Quaker City Uniform
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The most serious objection to allowing the trustee under .section
70e to assert the priority of any unsecured creditor with a provable
claim over a security interest is that it would enable the trustee to
invoke the notorious doctrine of the inchoate lien that has developed
in the application of the federal priority statute.43 Efforts of Government counsel to get the absolute priority afforded their client by the
Supreme Court's construction of this statute have been rebuffed by
bankruptcy courts, 44 and, except for a wayward Ninth Circuit ruling
of a few years ago, 45 the trustee in bankruptcy has been unable to
tum the doctrine of the inchoate lien to his advantage.
I have elsewhere elaborated the implications for secured creditors
of allowing the trustee to defeat any lien that cannot meet the
esoteric test of choateness which has been established by the Supreme Court for the administration of estates of insolvent debtors
of the Government outside of bankruptcy.46 Although the doctrine
Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1956), Referee Wolfe interpreted
it to require him to subordinate security interests to the landlord's priority conferred
by Pennsylvania law. In re George Townsend Co., 31 REF. J. 54 (1956). The ruling was
reversed by the district court, 180 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1957). A footnote in the court's
opinion, 180 F. Supp. at 626 n.3, mentioned that neither counsel nor the judge could
find any support in Pennsylvania law for the proposition that a landlord's priority was
superior to a consensual security interest, but the court's ruling rested on the ground
that, except as provided in § 67c, § 64 is inoperative until after valid liens are satisfied.
The relationship between priorities and liens is discussed generally in 3 COLLIER
1f 64.02[2] (1966).
43. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964). The doctrine is discussed in
Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of
the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954), and Kennedy, From Spokane
County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate
Lien, 50 IOWA L. REv. 724 (1965).
44. See, e.g., United States v• .Bradley, 321 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963); Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925,927, 930 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 734-35
(9th Cir. 1946); In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
Insofar as the cases cited herein deal with the priority of the federal tax lien, they
are subject to re-examination in the light of the development of the doctrine of the
inchoate lien discussed in the articles cited in note 43 supra and the enactment of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 80 Stat. 1125 (1966), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967). The
opinions stand unimpaired insofar as they deal with the relevance of R.Ev. STAT. § 3466
(1875) in bankruptcy. The ruling in United States v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942),
wherein the court apparently amalgamated the federal priority with the federal tax lien
statute, turned out to be an inadvertent precursor of United States v. Security Trust
&: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). The debtor in that case was a bankrupt, but the question therein decided arose in a case consolidating plenary actions of the United States
and the state of Illinois to foreclose their tax liens against the bankrupt's property.
45. Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1963). The rationale for
Rialto was substantially revised by the court of appeals sitting en bane in Bass v. Stodd,
357 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1966).
46. See Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on Rialto
Publishing Co. v. Bass, 17 STAN. L. REv. 793 (1965). The priority statute applies only
when such a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, but there is no four-month
time limit prescribed in the statute. There is a question whether the Government has
a provable claim for taxes in bankruptcy, inasmuch as § 63 does not include such a
claim in its catalogue of provable claims; this doubt, however, is hardly a serious one.
The ruling by the referee on this point in In re Cofax Corp., 96 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
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of the inchoate lien as it formerly applied in tax lien cases has been
significantly modified by the Tax Lien Act of 1966,47 this legislation
does not affect the priority of the United States under the general
priority statute; 48 not since the Court launched the doctrine of the
inchoate lien nearly forty years ago has it found a lien challenged
by the Government in a case under the statute to be sufficiently
choate to withstand the federal priority. Therefore, if the trustee
could exploit the federal priority under section 70e, the risks assumed by secured creditors would be significantly aggravated: Any
unpaid indebtedness to the federal government of any kind and of
any amount would afford the trustee a basis for leveling practically
every security interest against the property of the bankrupt.49
It is entirely possible to recognize that creditors with provable
claims may include one who is secured and that the trustee may
assert the rights of avoidance of such a creditor without agreeing
that the trustee is thereby subrogated to rights that depend on that
creditor's security interest rather than on his status as a creditor.
Thus a creditor holding a consensual security interest may avoid a
fraudulent transfer or one that fails to comply with Article Six of the
Code (Bulk Transfers) even if he is ordinarily better advised to rely
on his security than on his right of avoidance.50 Waiver of his security would not prejudice his right of avoidance. 51 On the other hand,
the lien creditor who prevails over an unfi.led or belatedly filed
1951), is not subject to criticism. See Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 888 (8th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Ingels v. Boteler, 100 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir.
1938), afj'd, 308 U.S. 57 (1939); In re Mercury Engineering, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 376, 382
(S.D. Cal. 1946) ('A tax or any exaction in the nature of a tax, while not strictly a debt,
is none the less a demand or claim of a quasi-contractual nature provable in bankruptcy"); 3 COLLIER 1J 63.26 (1966).
47. BO Stat. 1125 (1966), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967).
48. PLUMB&: WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 162-63 (2d ed. 1967).
49. In Otte v. Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1956), afj'd, 256 F.2d 112 (6th
Cir. 1958), the trustee, in attacking a mortgage given by the bankrupt to secure a purchase-money obligation of $3,150,000, relied in part on an argument that he was entitled under § 70e to assert the priority of the United States for its unpaid tax claims
of $160,000. Had the court sustained the argument, it would have served to enable the
trustee to invalidate the purchase-money mortgage on a showing of a dollar's worth of
debt to the United States. For a less dismal view of the chances for the holder of a
consensual security interest to survive competition with the federal priority than is
taken in the text, see PLUMB &: WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 48, at 161-62.
50. But cf. Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed on stipulation of counsel, 346 U.S. 863 (1953):
[L]ike any other equitable remedy, "avoidance" of the "transfer": i.e., rescission, is
a remedy dependent upon balancing the relative interests involved, and in a case
where the injured party has another and a complete remedy and where rescission
will deprive the wrongdoer of rights which are his in spite of his wrong, a court of
equity will not grant rescission.
51. Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227, 234 (1933). One may indeed be
estopped from asserting rights as a secured creditor and as an unsecured creditor in
respect of the same property when both positions are mutually inconsistent. Ibid.
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security interest under section 9-301 of the Code does so only by
virtue of the priority of his lien. Waiver or avoidance of his lien
would defeat his right to prevail over the security interest. Insofar
as one secured creditor prevails over another under any rule determining the validity or priority of liens inter se, it would be a wholly
arbitrary and fanciful result for the priority or validity of one of
them to be used as the basis for destroying the rights of the other in
what remains of the collateral after the first lien has been wholly
satisfied. A rule giving A priority over B should not, after it has
served to protect A against B, be reloaded to knock out B altogether
for the sake of claimants who were never intended to be protected
by the rule giving A priority. Such perversion of the purposes of
state law to the end of enlarging bankruptcy estates should not be
enforced by the courts unless compelled in unmistakable terms by
the Bankruptcy Act. No such compulsion is to be found in section
70e. 52
The proponents of the view that the trustee may be subrogated
to the rights of a secured creditor for the purpose of avoiding a
transfer under section 70e have supposed only that the trustee might
step into the shoes of a judicial lien creditor or tax lienor.53 But is
there any warrant for distinguishing between the right of subrogation to the position of such a creditor and the right to assert the
position of a creditor whose priority rests on his being the first to perfect a consensual security interest? Clearly the source and nature of
the lien of a secured creditor is a matter of indifference in determining the provability of his claim. Accordingly it appears that if the
trustee can assert the rights that inhere in the secured status rather
than the creditor status of such a creditor, he can elect to take the
52. An analysis of the role of § 70e substantially in accord with the text is found in
the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635, 63940 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed on stipulation of counsel, 346 U.S. 863 (1953):
It seems likely that the proper interpretation of the section [70eJ is that it applies
only to occasions where the "Federal or State law" "under" which the "transfer" is
"avoided" directly nullifies it ex proprio vigore, and not indirectly by creating
rights (e.g. a lien) out of some transactions between one creditor and the bankrupt
which the "transfer" would defeat, if it were valid; in short that the "creditor's"
right must be conferred upon him simply because he is a creditor. One can see how
the .Bankruptcy Act might wish to provide that the benefit of such a "law" should
redound to the benefit of all creditors; but to go further seems to us to impute to
Congress a most improbable intent. Suppose, for example, that the bankrupt borrows money from A upon an agreement that A shall have as security a one half
interest in the bankrupt's stock in trade, or the whole interest in a specified part
of that stock; and that the bankrupt then "transfers" the stock to B, who takes
with notice of the agreement. A can "avoid" the "transfer" as to his interest in the
stock; but may the bankrupt's trustee reclaim as part of the estate, not only that
half, but the half which A [the bankrupt?] was free to "transfer" and B to receive?
If so .B has lost what he was confessedly free to acquire as a penalty for taking from
A what he was not free to acquire.
53. See notes 1-2 supra.
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position of whatever secured creditor is most advantageously placed
in order to level all liens and interests inferior to him, whatever their
source and character.
The difficulty with recognizing subrogation of the trustee to the
rights of the holder of any valid lien of any variety is the same, and
it is fundamental: Section 70e was intended to enable the trustee
to bring into the estate for distribution property which the debtor
has put beyond his reach but which the creditors could have reached
by appropriate action but for bankruptcy. The subdivision has been
interpreted in the light of this entirely intelligible purpose, and even
Moore v. Bay is consistent with the limitation that the rights of the
trustee by subrogation be derived from unsecured creditors. To vest
him with the special rights, whether of priority or avoidance, belonging to secured creditors whom he does not represent and whom he
cannot displace requires an attribution to Congress of an irrational
design to invalidate all but one layer of liens against bankrupt estates.
IV.

SUBROGATION OF THE TRUSTEE TO THE RIGHTS OF A
CREDITOR HoLDING A VOIDABLE

LmN

There is no departure from the Bankruptcy Act if the right of
the trustee to be subrogated to the position of a secured creditor is
confined to those cases in which the secured creditor can be displaced
by avoidance of his lien. It is nonetheless submitted that, with a single
qualification hereafter noted, 54 invocation of the doctrine of Moore
v. Bay to enable the trustee to extend the priority of the secured
creditor without limitation is incompatible with the design of the
act.
Thus, suppose that during a day's delay in the perfection of a
mortgage of a $10,000 chattel to secure a present advance of $10,000,
a creditor with a $1,000 claim attached the asset. If bankruptcy should
ensue within four months, the trustee could avoid the attachment lien
under section 67a on a showing that the bankrupt was insolvent at
the time of the attachment. Avoidance of the lien, however, would
be bootless for the estate if the result is simply to remove a limitation
on the enforcement of the mortgage. To protect the estate against
such an eventuality, that is, having the avoidance redound to the
benefit of junior lienors or other persons not intended to be benefitted by the administration of the estate in bankruptcy, Congress
provided in section 67a for preservation of the $1,000 lien for the
benefit of the estate. The attaching creditor would be in no position
54. See text accompanying note 69 infra.

May 1967]

Article Nine: Bankruptcy

1435

to complain of losing his lien to the estate because his lien conflicted
with the policy of the Bankruptcy Act embodied in section 67a. Nor
would the secured creditor be in a position to complain of the preservation since he would not be prejudiced thereby. Nonetheless, the
argument has been made that in the situation presented, if the attaching creditor has a provable claim, the trustee should be able to
invoke section 70e as against the chattel mortgage and he should not
be limited by the $1,000 claim of the attaching creditor when he proceeds under this section.1m The argument, however, makes the preservation provision superfluous in the situation for which it was designed.56
The preservation clauses of sections 60b, 67a(3), 67d, and 70e
are no more than provisions authorizing the trustee to be subrogated
to the rights of a person who can no longer enforce them under the
Bankruptcy Act, when unconditional avoidance of such rights would
not benefit the estate. Such a situation is presented when a voidable
lien or other interest is superior to another lien or interest that is
indefeasible by the trustee. It would be a perversion of the purpose
of the avoidance provisions of the act for the trustee to strike down a
lien or other interest for the benefit of persons who are not intended
beneficiaries of the trust being administered in bankruptcy and
against whom the voidable lien or other interest is entirely valid.
But it would be an invidious and patently unintended construction
of the act to allow the trustee to preserve the priority of a lien or
other interest voidable under the act as against the holder of an
interest otherwise indefeasible but to insist that as trustee he is in
no way limited by the amount of the lien or interest preserved. Under such a construction the trustee takes everything if he can take
55. The argument is suggested rather than supported in COUNTRYMAN, CAsES ON
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 454, 522-23 (1964), and Loiseaux, Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 15 VANn. L. REv. 137, 145-46 (1961).
A case made to order for exploitation of the view of the trustee's rights of unlimited
subrogation to the priority of the holder of a lien voidable under the act is In re
Andrews, 172 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1949). Here a chattel mortgage securing a $3,200 claim
became voidable by the trustee under § 70e by virtue of a delay in the effectiveness of the
filing of the mortgage. A junior chattel mortgage securing a claim of $10,500 was indefeasible by the trustee but was not permitted to take advantage of the gap in the
perfection of the senior mortgage because the junior mortgagee was in no way prejudiced
thereby. The collateral sold for $14,100. The court apparently limited the trustee's
recovery under § 70e to $3,600. Although the trustee was represented by counsel of
acknowledged competence, no effort was apparently made to invoke Moore v. Bay as a
weapon against the junior mortgage. No criticism of counsel is intended. On the contrary, as I have tried to show in this article, employment of that case for such a purpose
would turn its doubtful doctrine against innocent parties for no other reason than
that their collateral was subject to another rival lien or interest voidable by the trustee
in bankruptcy.
56. See 4 COLLIER 1[ 67.16.
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anything. This is of course the oft-repeated and oft-rejected objection
directed at the doctrine of Moore v. Bay. Here, however, the doctrine
is being used to defeat utterly the rights of persons who by hypothesis do not fall under the condemnation of any provision or policy of
the act; it is only fortuitous that their rights attach to property subject to a competing lien or interest voidable by the trustee. It is one
thing to insist that such persons not enjoy a windfall in the event of
bankruptcy. It is another to say that Congress has demanded from
such persons a sacrifice of their rights to the Moloch of Bankruptcy.
Prior to the Chandler Act, there were three provisions in the
Bankruptcy Act which authorized subrogation of the trustee to the
priority rights of creditors displaced by the trustee. All of these provisions were in section 67. Section 67b read as follows:
Whenever a creditor is prevented from enforcing his rights as against
a lien created, or attempted to be created, by his debtor, who afterwards becomes a bankrupt, the trustee of the estate of such bankrupt
shall be subrogated to and may enforce such rights of such creditor
for the benefit of the estate. 57
Section 67c, which is one of the precursors of present section 67a,
provided that
if the dissolution . . . [of any lien thereunder] would militate
against the best interests of the estate of such person the same shall
not be dissolved, but the trustee of the estate of such person, for the
benefit of the estate, shall be subrogated to the rights of the holder
of such lien and em powered to perfect and enforce the same in his
name as trustee with like force and effect as such holder might have
done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.58
Finally, an overlapping provision in section 67f, also one of the precursors of present section 67a, nullified liens obtained through legal
proceedings but qualified such nullification by a clause authorizing
the court
on due notice, [to] order that the right under such levy, judgment,
attachment, or other lien shall be preserved for the benefit of the
estate; and thereupon the same may pass to and shall be preserved
by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as aforesaid. 5o
It was thus clear that the trustee might step into the shoes of any
creditor who but for bankruptcy could have enforced rights against
any lien or other interest created by his debtor. However, no one
57. 30 Stat. 564 (1898).
58. 30 Stat. 564 (1898).
59. 30 Stat. 565 (1898).
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seems to have suggested before 1938 that the trustee could also step
into the shoes of any creditor who notwithstanding bankruptcy could
enforce rights against any lien created by the debtor or of any creditor
whose lien was not voidable under section 67c or section 67f. 60
The subrogation provision of old subdivision b was eliminated
in the Chandler Act's recast of section 67, with this less than adequate
legislative explanation: "The substance of subdivision b is . . .
covered by the provision in the expanded section 60b, which confers
upon the trustee the subrogated right to retain the benefits of an
avoided preferential lien." 61 As noted above, subdivisions c and f of
old section 67 were merged in the new section 67a. Inexplicably no
preservation provisions were included in the other avoidance sections
until 1952, when preservation provisos were inserted in sections 67d
and 70e. 62 The legislative reports accompanying the amendment of
section 70e explained the purpose of the preservation proviso as that
of "subrogating the trustee to the rights of the transferee . . . so
that the benefits intended for the estate would not be passed on to
junior interests not entitled thereto." 63
When subdivisions c and f of old section 67 were merged into the
new subdivision a in 1938, the preservation clause of old subdivision
f rather than the language of subrogation used in old subdivision c
was carried over into new section 67a(3). However, since the effect of
an order preserving a lien for the benefit of the estate is precisely the
same as an order authorizing subrogation of the trustee to the rights
of the holder of a voidable lien, no significance is to be attached to
this stylistic choice.64
The language of former section 67c was explicit in limiting the
trustee's rights as subrogee to those of the holder of the lien dissolved
by the subdivision. It is inherent in the notion of subrogation, however, that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights than
60. Cf. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 179 (Students' ed. 1911):
[T]here still exist those cases where a chattel mortgagee has filed bis mortgage
after a levy by some creditor upon the property and before the bankruptcy court
bas seized the property, in which event, only by virtue of subrogation to the creditor's lien would the trustee be able to invalidate the chattel mortgage; such subrogation, however, only being possible where the legal proceedings bad created
the lien within the four months preceding the bankruptcy.
61. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1937).
62. 66 Stat. 429, 430 (1952).
63. H.R. REP. No, 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952); S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 19 (1952).
64. There was another difference between former subdivisions c and f which disappeared in the merger: Subrogation was apparently automatic under subdivision c on
a finding that dissolution "would militate against the best interests of the estate,"
whereas an order of preservation under subdivision f was discretionary, as it is under
present subdivision a. This difference was of more theoretical than actual significance.
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those of the person to whose position he is subrogated. 65 Although
judicial declaration or exposition of these truisms does not abound,
no case construing the preservation clauses of the Bankruptcy Act has
been found to cast any doubt upon them. 66
The addition of the preservation clauses in 1938 and 1952 constitutes convincing evidence that Congress has not adopted the view
that the trustee may utilize section 70e as brigaded by Moore v. Bay
whenever he can find a creditor with a provable claim and a lien
prior to other liens. If the trustee could step into the shoes of a prior
lienor without being limited by the amount of his lien, the addition
of these clauses would have been largely gratuitous legislation. 67 On
the contrary, however, the legislative explanations indicate an apprehension of a need to be served by the amendments which is entirely
consonant with the scheme of the act herein elaborated. 68 The absence of any acknowledgment or intimation that the trustee had an
65. DIXON, SUBROGATION 20 (1862); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) A.ND
EQUITABLE REMEDIES (2d ed.) 5198 (1919); SHELDON, THE LA.w OF SUBROGATION 8 (2d ed.
1893).
66. See, e.g., Rocle Island Plow Co. v. Reardon, 222 U.S. 354 (1912); First Nat'l Bank
v. Staake, 202 U.S. 141 (1906). In the last cited case, attachment liens securing claims of
$40,000 were preserved pursuant to former § 67f for the benefit of the estate of a bankrupt who had sold the property for $500,000 in stoclc after the attachment but before
the bankruptcy. The Court pointed out that the effect of the order of the preservation
was that "so much of the value of the property attached as is represented by the attachments passes to the trustee for the benefit of the entire body of creditors •••. "
202 U.S. at 146.
67. According to this view of § 70e, there is no need for a preservation provision
when the holder of an avoided lien or other interest has a provable claim. The avoidance under §§ 60 or 67 eliminates the embarrassment created by his claim of lien or
other interest as against the trustee, and § 70e enables him to devastate inferior liens
and interests.
68. See text accompanying note 60 supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, 15, 16 (1952); Duberstein, Highlights of Bankruptcy Amendments, 27 REF.
J. 21 (1952). It is nevertheless arguable that the preservation provisions were not necessary to prevent proceedings for avoidance from redounding to the benefit of the holders
of junior indefeasible interests. See In re Edward Bibinger, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d
237, 239, 210 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1961) (assignee allowed to assert priority or an unfiled mortgage as against subsequent indefeasible mortgage, without statutory authorization therefor, to avoid "unearned windfall" to junior mortgagee-senior mortgage consumed the entire property); cf. In re Andrews, 172 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1949) (security
interest voidable by trustee under § 70e not preserved as against indefeasible junior
security interest, but windfall prevented by allowing holder of voidable lien to collect
out of fund allocated to junior Iienor). Preservation of liens postponed by former
§ 67c(l) for the benefit of claims entitled to priority under §§ 64a(l) &: (2) was effectuated
without express statutory authority in California State Dep't of Employment v. United
States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Jordan v. Hamlett, 312 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir.
1963); In re American Zyloptic Co., 181 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). The necessity of
legislation to prevent escalation by junior interests in consequence of avoidance is
asserted in In re Espelund, 181 F. Supp. 108, 112 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Sachs, Trustee's
Rights of Subrogation to Creditor's Liens, 15 REF. J. 105 (1941). The view espoused by
these authorities, like the official explanations cited supra, do not comport with the
suggestion that the trustee can be subrogated to the priority of any creditor with a
voidable lien under § 70e and can cram down all inferior interests without limit.
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alternative remedy more potent than that being provided by the
amendments is eloquent evidence of an understanding that no such
remedy was available.
It should nevertheless be clear that the trustee is not bound by
the limits of a voidable lien if he otherwise has a right of recovery
under section 70e. Thus, suppose that within four months after a
creditor has obtained a lien by attachment, creditor's bill, or judgment, against property fraudulently transferred, the debtor becomes
bankrupt. Although the trustee may be able to get the lien preserved
for the benefit of the estate pursuant to section 67a(3), he is not
bound to choose that remedy if section 70e affords him a larger recovery. That proposition had been established before the advent of
Moore v. Bay and stands independently of it. 69 The significance of
Moore v. Bay in this situation is that, as indicated above, the trustee
may avoid the lien of the creditor under section 67a and, relying on
the same creditor's right to avoid the transfer under section 70e, recover the fraudulently transferred property without being limited by
the amount of that creditor's claim. This result is simply an illustration of the anomalies that flow from the doctrine of Moore v. Bay.
SUMMARY

I. The trustee may under section 70e avoid any security interest
that is voidable by a creditor with a provable claim against the estate,
for example, on the ground that the security interest is a fraudulent
transfer, irrespective of whether the creditor's claim is also allowable
or secured.
2. Under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, the trustee is not restricted in his recovery under section 70e by the amount of the claim
of the creditor whose right of avoidance he asserts under this subdivision.
3. If an unsecured creditor of the estate has merely a right of
priority over a security interest as distinguished from a right of avoidance, the trustee is not entitled to assert the right of priority in derogation of a secured creditor's rights in the collateral.
4. The trustee may under section 70c assert all the rights of
69. In Campbell v. Calcasieu Nat'l Bank, 12 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 720 (1926), a creditor had obtained a lien by judgment in proceedings to avoid a
mortgage as fraudulent. The judgment lien was held voidable under former § 67f and
subject to preservation under the same subdivision, but the court properly pointed out
that the trustee's rights under that subdivision were not exclusive of his right to avoid
the mortgage in toto pursuant to § 70e. Accord, Campbell v. Dalbey, 23 F.2d 229 (5th
Cir. 1928). Although both these rulings antedated Moore v. Bay, the court's opinions
seem to have anticipated it by assuming an unlimited right of recovery under § 70e.
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priority as well as of avoidance against the holder of a security interest that could have been asserted by a creditor who obtained a lien
by judicial proceedings on the date of bankruptcy against the property subject to such security interest.
5. If a security interest may be avoided only by a creditor who
had extended credit at some critical juncture and who had obtained
a lien by judicial proceedings against the property subject to the
security interest in question, the trustee may avoid the security interest only if there is an actual creditor with a provable claim against
the estate who extended credit at the critical time before bankruptcy,
but he need not have acquired a lien by judicial proceedings.
6. If the trustee's avoidance of a security interest pursuant to
section 60, 67a, 67c(l), or 67d would redound to the benefit of the
holder of a junior security interest otherwise indefeasible by the
trustee or to any person or persons other than the general creditors,
the trustee may obtain an order preserving the voidable security interest for the benefit of the estate.
7. When a security interest is preserved for the benefit of the
estate under section 60b, 67a, 67c(2), or 67d, the trustee is limited
in his recovery to the amount of the claim of the creditor whose
security interest is preserved.
8. When a security interest is preserved for the benefit of the
estate under section 70e, the amount of the secured creditor's claim
is no more a limit on the trustee's recovery than it is in a case when
the trustee seeks and obtains avoidance under that subdivision.
9. If a secured creditor of the estate has priority over another
secured creditor in the collateral subject to their security interests,
the trustee is not entitled to assert the right of priority of the one
against the other if the prior interest is not voidable and thus not
preservable for the benefit of the estate.
10. If a secured creditor with a provable claim against the estate
has a right to avoid the security interest of another independently of
any claim of priority dependent on his security, the trustee may assert
the right of avoidance, subject to the secured creditor's right to enforce his security interest if indefeasible by the trustee.
11. A lien creditor's right against an unperfected security interest under section 9-301 of the Code is a right of priority which the
trustee is not entitled to assert under section 70e.
12. The priority of a lien obtained by judicial proceedings over
a security interest (as provided by section 9-301(1)(b) of the Code)
may be preserved for the benefit of the estate if the lien so obtained
thereafter becomes voidable under section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act.

